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ABSTRACT 
The user equilibrium in traffic assignment problem is to choose the minimum-cost 
path between every origin-destination pair and through this process. In this study, 
we consider the infeasible user equilibrium in traffic assignment problem. That is, 
there does not exist any solution of the problem. And, we are interested in what is 
the minimum degree of relaxation we should do so that the problem can exist at 
least one solution. Therefore, we apply the method and concept of the theory of 
fuzzy resolution on the infeasibiliv of variational inequality to solve the infeasible 
user equilibrium problem. 
1. Introduction 
The traffic assignment or network equilibrium[2] problem is to predict 
the steady-state flow of a transportation network. It is an application of 
variational inequality problem[ 1, 41. The user equi-librium in traffic 
assignment problem is to choose the minimum-cost path between every 
origin-destination pair and through this process, those utilized paths will 
have equal costs. Thus, in the model of user equilibrium, denoted by 
UE(c,T), we need to know which arcs are included in the desired paths in 
the transportation network; and what are the cost, c, and demand function T 
for transportation between every arc before solving this problem. Then, the 
problem is solved when the demand is satisfied and the paths with costs 
higher than the minimum cost will have no flow. But, in the real world, the 
user equilibrium sometimes is infeasible, there does not exist any solution 
of the problem, and we are interested in what is the minimum degree of 
relaxation we should do so that the problem can exist at least one solution. 
In other words, we intend to answer a question of "how much tolerance one 
allows to make the original problem soluable." Since to determine such 
"tolerance" level is not easy and uncertain, we shall apply the concept of 
fuzzy set theory to "soften" the original (crisp) user equilibrium problem 
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with a fuzzy relation, denoted by UE(c, T ) .  Mathematically, the classical 
user equilibrium, UE(c,T), can be modeled as a variational inequality 
problem, and with fuzzy phenomena indicated above, the developed 
method on the variational inequality with fuzzy relation[5], denoted by 
VI(X,f ) ,  will be used to establish a traffic equilibrium pattern. In this 
way the induced solutions of V I ( X , f )  can provide the information of "if 
p value of relaxation is allowed on relations, one will have the "desired" 
solution x* which reaches p degree of optimality. 
2. Problem formulation 
First, we specify the notations defined by Friesz[2], which are needed 
for the formulation of the traffic assignment problem: 
G( V,A) = a network graph G in which A represents the set of arcs and V the 
W E  the set of origin-destination(0-D) pairs w = ( i j ) ~  W, 
- 
- 
node set, 
Pw =the set of paths connecting 0-D pair WE W, 
e, 3 the flow on arc a d ,  e = (e ,  : a E A )  , 
h =the flow on pathpEP, h = ( h p : p  E P), 
p = U pw 
W € W  
P- 
1 if pathp E P traveraes arc a E A ,  
6 = {  
up 0 otherwise, 
A =  [6 
c, ( e )  =the average transportation cost function for arc a d ,  
1, the arc-path incidence matrix, 
UP 
c ( e )  = (c,(e):a E A ) ,  
C ( h )  P the average transportation cost function for path PEP, 
C ( h )  = (C,(h):p E P), 
U ,  =the minimum transportation cost between 0 - D  pair WE W, 
U = (u,:w E W )  = minpEp W (C,(h)}, 
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t ,  ( U) =the demand for transportation between 0-D pair W E  W, 
t ( u )  = ( tw(u ) :w  E W ) ,  
where e = Ah, C( h )  = ATc( e ) .  
Definition 2.1. [2] A flow-cost pattem (e*,u*) is user equilibrium 
UE(c,t) if it satisfies the following condition: 
h p [ C p ( h ) - ~ , ] = O ,  Cp(h)-U,>O, hp 2 0 ,  V W E W , ~  ~ l ' ~ ( l - 1 )  
C hp - t ,  ( U )  = 0,  U ,  2 0, V W €  w. (1-2) 
P EPW 
Let H=[H..] be a path incidence matrix, then, if the j-th path belongs 
!I 
to the path set$, H..=l; otherwise, H..=O. By rewriting equation (1-2) as Y Y 
t ( u )  = (~ , (u ) :w  E W ) =  ( h,:W E W )  = Hh (2) 
P EPW 
we have the following result. 
Theorem2.1. Let t ( u )  be an invertible function and Cp be the inverse 
function. Then (e*,t*)= (AA*,ffh*) is a user equilibrium UE(c,t) if and 
only if h* solves the following V I ( X , f ) :  
< c( Ah*)T A - <D( Hh*)T H ,  h - h* >2 0 VhEX (3) 
whereX={h: h 2 0, h + 0 ,  Hh 2 O } , d  f (h)=c(Ah)TA - @(Hh)T H .  
Proof. 
UE(c,t) if and only if ( e * ,  t *) solves the following VI(X',f ') problem: 
From [1,4], we know ( e * , t * )  is a user equilibrium solution of 
c(e*IT(e -e*> - m(t* lT( t  - t*> 2 o V ( e , T )  EX (4) 
where X'={(e,t): e = A h ,  h = t ,  V ~ E  W, h20, P O } .  P 
Let ( e  *, t *) = ( A h  *, Hh*), then (3) are equivalent to (4), and the theorem 
is true. 0 
P EPW 
1 os 
Next, we consider the user equilibrium problem with fuzzy relation, 
denoted by UE(c,T). By theorem 2.1, UE(c,T) can be reformulated into 
a variational inequality with fuzzy relation, which is denoted by V I ( X , f ) .  
Since the set X defined above is a convex cone, hence by [5]  the solution 
set of VI( X ,  f) is fuzzy. And then we obtain the following result. 
Theorem22 Let t ( u )  be an invertible function. Then (e* , t*)=  
(Ah*,Hh) with degree p, 0 5 p I 1, is a user equilibrium of UE(c,T) 
iff h * with degree p , solves the following VI( X ,  f ) : 
- - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
< f ( h * ) ,  h-h*>>O Y h E X  ( 5 )  - 
where 
X={h:  h 2 0 ,  h z 0 ,  Hh20}and f (h )=c(Ah)TA-Q(Hh)TH.  
That is, a vector f ( h * )  corresponding to h* satisfies that < f ( h * ) ,  h-h*>2 
0 for all hEX to some degree p, OIpI1, and, (e* , t*)=  (Ah*,Hh) 
satisfies the property of user equilibrium to some degree p and is denoted 
by ( ( e * , t * ) ,  p). Thus, the solution set is a fuzzy set. 
Corollary 2.2. Let t ( u )  be an invertible function. Then (e* , t*)=  
(Ah*, Hh) with degree p, 0 5 p I 1, is a user equilibrium solution of 
UE(',T) iff h * with degree p, solves the following VI(X,f) ' :  
- - 
< f ( h * ) ,  h -h*>>-p ,  p > O  Y h E X  (6 )  
with 
c L =  
0 if p ' l - p  
a if 0 > p '> - p  
1 if p ' 2 0  
where < f ( x * ) , x  - x*  >2 p'  for all x E 
P 
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X={ h: h 2 0, h f 0, Hh 2 0} and f ( h )  = C( Ah)T A - @( Hh)T H .  
Then, the equivalent single objective programming model of VI( x , f ) ' (6 )  
can be derived as below[5]: 
- 
(SOP) (7) 
Minimize 8 
subjectto h 2 O , ( - p + q ) 0 1 f ( h ) h 1 q e , - p + q  < O ,  q>O,  
d i ' f ( h )  2 ( -p+q)B i = 1,2, ...p 0 I 8 I 1 
Theorem 2.3. Let Xeff denote the set of all efficient solutions of an SOP. 
Then x * with objective value 8 * belongs to Xe8 iff x* is a solution of 
VI(X,f) ' (6) to the degree of p=(l- 8 *). 
Corollary 2.3.1. Let t ( u )  be an invertible function. Then (e*,t*)= 
(Ah*,  Hh) with degree p = (1 - e*) is a user equilibrium of UE(c, T )  iff 
h * E Xefl with objective value 8 * is a solution of SOP(7). 
that the model (6) can exist at least one solution. 
- 
- 
Furthermore, we want to know the minimum value the p should be so 
(SOP') (8) 
Mnimize p 
subjectto hrO, ( - p + q ) B ~ f ( h ) h ~ q e ,  - p + q  C O ,  q>O,  
d i ' f ( h )  2 ( - p + q ) e  i = 1,2, ..., m 0 < 0  5 1 
Corollary 2.3.2. Suppose VI(X,f)(3) is infeasible and p* is an optimal 
solution of model(8). Then the corresponding VI( X,f) '(6) will have 
feasible solution whenp>p*. 
Y 
Corollary 2.3.3. Suppose UE(c,T)(I) is infeasible and p* is an optimal 
- 
solution of model(8). Then UE( c ,  T )  have feasible solution iff the 
corresponding VI( X , f ) ' ( 6 )  is with somep2p*. 
- 
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Therefore, if an user equilibrium is infeasible, we can solve model (8) 
to obtain the minimum relaxation p* of this infeasible user equilibrium. 
And then, the solution set of the relaxed user equilibrium can be found by 
solving model (7). 
3. Summary 
This study focuses on solving infeasible user equilibrium in traffic 
assignment problem. By considering it as a variational inequality problem 
with fuzzy relation, this problem is reformulated into a single objective 
programming model by fuzzy set theory[5]. The purpose of utilizing fuzzy 
relation is to ''relax" the original problem to certain level and then the 
solutions which satisfy equilibrium property to some degree will be found. 
An equivalent single objective programming model for solving the fuzzy 
system is designed to find the fuzzy solution set. Furthermore, another 
single objective programming model is developed to find the minimum 
relaxation value so that the original problem can be soluable. 
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